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Abstract 
 
This explanatory study investigates the impact of terrorism on trade in North-East Nigeria. It further 
shows the empirical investigation of the scenario in which continuous mayhem posed by the ‘Boko 
Haram’ insurgent group has caused Nigeria loss in revenue over the past six years. Government has 
so far failed in it’s strive to provide the citizens with adequate security for life and properties, as 
well as an enabling environment for trade and investments which can also positively stimulate its 
revenue as a nation. As, there are numerous impacts of terrorism in Nigeria, trade is one of the key 
to the North-East region as their major source of income as well as revenue to the government. The 
study will use secondary data and will be guided by frustration-aggression theory to connect facts 
and give a meaningful context. Hence, the findings are expected to indicate possible relationship 
between terrorism and trade in the North-Eastern region. To this end, while applying the frustration-
aggression theory, the researcher will propose some possible policy recommendations to the 
government on how to halt the menace threatening its revenue base, traders and investors.   
Keywords: ‘Boko Haram’, Terrorism, Frustration-Aggression Theory, North-Eastern Region, 
Trade 
 
1. Introduction 
As rightly maintained by Ted Gurr, a world renowned Criminologist, “when expectations go up 
and realities go down, men rebel”. Terrorism and terrorist activities have become a global 
phenomenon; this has prompted the attention of researchers all over the world to dive in and 
contribute to the menace and also to the body of knowledge. Since the September 11 attack on the 
world trade center in the United State of America, terrorism has been on the rise in several countries 
of world. 
Boko Haram emerged as a militant Islamic fundamentalist sect in Nigeria (Onwuamaeze, 2011). 
The official name of the group is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, which is Arabic for 
‘People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad’. The literal translation 
is ‘Association of Sunnas for the Propagation of Islam and for Holy War’.  
Nigeria now has the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world according 
to the United Nations which believes that as many as 1.5m people have been driven from their 
homes by Boko Haram.   Over the last six years, Boko Haram has been waging a war of terror in 
Nigeria's northeast forcing villagers to abandon their homes in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States 
mostly.  
According to Odeyemi J, (2015) Over 57,000 Nigerian refugees are in neighboring countries; 
Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger seeking shelter as confirmed by the National Emergency 
Management Agency (NEMA). 
  
Therefore, the study will limit its scope to North-East Nigeria by focusing on Boko Haram terrorist 
activities and its impact on trade within the region under review. The limitation of the work is from 
2009-2015 as this is the period in which the Boko Haram terrorist activities started making its 
impact felt on trade and other business related activities in the North East region of Nigeria. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Boko Haram terrorist activities continuously affect production, whole sale, retail businesses and 
investments as well as import and export trade (with the neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger) 
in the North-East region of Nigeria. This is seen in the continuous decline in the government 
revenue generated through payment of business tax in trade and investment activities in the North 
East region since the inception of the insurgency in 2009 to date.  
Coleman (2015), Borno state is affected most by the so-called “Boko Haram” terrorist group. It is 
however the first state that the group emerged, also the state that has suffered most from the whole 
crisis in Nigeria. The state has witnessed series of terrorist activities, ranging from the abduction of 
more than 200 school girls, suicide bombing of innocent citizens, forceful recruitment of children 
and adults into the terror group, random assassinations of prominent members of the state, capture 
and control of more than 2/3 of the state territories by the insurgent group among other ill activities. 
As such, it brought about a ripple effect of flow of internally displaced people moving into some of 
the neighboring states in the North-East region.  
Nigeria now has the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world according 
to the United Nations which believes that as many as 1.5 million people have been driven from 
their homes by Boko Haram.   Over the last six years, Boko Haram has been waging a war of terror 
in Nigeria's northeast forcing villagers to abandon their homes majorly in Borno, Yobe and 
Adamawa States. Hundreds of thousands of others have also fled to neighboring countries; 
Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic for safety. 
This however, brought about closure of businesses and investments in most of the states in the 
region. People are afraid to use some of the major roads linking the states and other communities 
due to series of attacks by the insurgents. BBC on 7th September, 2015 confirmed that Nigerian 
Military announced the closure of all local weekly markets in Borno State. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
In order to complete this research study, there are some key objectives that need to be addressed; 
a) To explore the nature of attacks and threats faced by investors in the North East region by the 
“Boko Haram” terrorist. 
b) To analyze how the terrorist activities affect local trade, as well as import and export trade in 
the North East region. 
c) To evaluate how the Nigeria government can overcome the “Boko Haram” Terrorist activities.  
2. Literature Review 
  
2.1 Terrorism Concepts 
The term terrorism is not entirely new in politics and international relations vocabulary. Therefore, 
what is terrorism? Why is it there? Who are terrorists? What are the ways to deal with it? These are 
the major questions that concern researchers who studied this social phenomenon.  
The term ‘terrorism’ suggests political violence or insurgency primarily. Terrorists kill people or 
destroy property for political purposes. But using the concept of terrorism as a synonym for political 
violence, which is done in political science literature, is a reductionist approach. According to 
Wilkinson and Stewart (1987), there is a general recognition that terrorism is a specific method of 
struggle rather than a synonym for political violence or insurgency. According to Brian Jenkins (in 
Wilkinson and Stewart 1987), terrorism can be described as a kind of weapons system. This is a 
useful definition to some extent because it provides a context to the researcher in which this weapon 
can be used by various actors. It is not the weapon of one group, organization or ideology but it is 
the weapon of various actors in the international system. It is indeed insightful to describe terrorism 
as the weapon of the poor. Terrorism is more likely to be used by ‘poorer’ groups who need to bring 
an expensive political change because terrorist activities induce lower costs but may bring 
significant political changes (Özdamar, 2008). 
The U.S. Department of State has commended Nigeria for “forging an anti-terrorism consensus” in 
sub-Saharan Africa following al Qaeda’s attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. 
In fact, Nigeria has coordinated the U.S.-led Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, which 
conducts counterterrorism exercises in the region to prevent extremist groups from taking root 
(Coleman, 2015).  
2.2 Implications of Boko Haram to Trade in Nigeria 
Boko Haram terrorist has a bad signal to foreign investors with interest in Nigeria. Economic 
experts have described former President Goodluck Jonathan’s economic reform as an effort that 
may yield no results due to the insurgency situation in Nigeria. They also said the only problems 
with the nation’s economy were Boko Haram terrorist activities and mismanagement of government 
resources. A professor in the Department of Economics of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Dr. 
Usman Muttaka, who spoke to SUNDAY PUNCH recently on the telephone, said even if Jonathan 
had gone to Switzerland for the World Economic Forum, it would have yielded no result. He said, 
the president was in Australia for a similar summit with about 500 delegates and he has done 
nothing. He also went to France with about 300 delegates but there was no tangible result. The issue 
of investment is also about the issue of security. No investor will come to invest in Nigeria with the 
current security challenge (Baiyewu, 2012:9). 
 
Figure 1: Global terrorist casualties 2013 – 2014 
  
 
Source: Posted by; Awala V. (2015) 
Figure 2 above portrays the Global terrorist casualties between 2013 – 2014. The number of people 
killed in terrorist attacks around the world rose sharply in 2014, according to the US State 
Department. Compared to 2013, attacks were up 35 percent while fatalities increased 81 percent, 
reaching 32,700. This trend is primarily due to activity in Iraq, Afghanistan and Nigeria, as well as 
the exceptionally lethal manner of many attacks (Awala V.  2015). 
Out of the attacks where perpetrator information was available, Boko Haram came first for lethality. 
The Nigerian jihadist group was responsible for 6,644 deaths in 2014, slightly ahead of ISIL who 
inflicted 6,286 fatalities during the same year. The Taliban had the third highest death toll of any 
terrorist group worldwide last year according to the US State Department (Awala V.  2015). 
 
2.3 Economic Consequences of Boko Haram Terrorist on Trade in Nigeria 
Here, a question needed to be asked ‘Can incentives to attack trade and other businesses increase 
the activities of Terrorist’. It could be observed that Terrorists are rational actors because they want 
to achieve their stated goal and objectives as efficiently as possible. The specific goals of a terrorist 
group may appear outlandish and difficult to appreciate by outside observers, but terrorists, 
nevertheless, will endeavor to reach these goals as efficiently as they can. They strive to achieve a 
maximum effect through the actions chosen. Empirical research has convincingly established that 
terrorists indeed opt for those kinds of actions from which they expect the highest benefit–cost ratio. 
If, for instance, the police and other security apparatus (Immigration, custom, state security services 
etc.) make some kind of terrorist act more difficult to accomplish, terrorists quickly shift to a 
different attack mode. Terrorists being rational actors, it is necessary to consider the benefit–cost 
relationships of various strategies from the point of view of the terrorists (Oladimeji & Oresanwo, 
2014). 
 
  
However, Oladimeji and Oresanwo, (2014) it could be seen vividly that in recent years, Boko 
Haram terrorist has shown new patterns, shifting increasingly from police and military targets to 
civilian targets (i.e. hostage taking, kidnapping and other forms of recruitments), including Trade 
and business activities. Recent terrorist attacks in Nigeria affected both the national and the 
international economy. The economic consequences can be largely broken down into short term 
direct effects; medium-term confidence effects and longer term productivity effects. 
The direct economic effects of terrorism includes; the destruction of life and properties, responses 
to the emergency, restoration of the systems and the infrastructure affected and the provision of 
temporary living assistance, are most pronounced in the immediate aftermath of the attacks and 
thus matter more in the short run. Direct economic costs are likely to be proportionate to the 
intensity of the attacks and the size and the characteristics of the economy affected. Major attacks 
in Abuja, Adamawa, Borno, Bauchi, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, and Yobe states of Nigeria by Boko 
Harram sect has caused major activity disruption especially the Abuja bomb blast that happened in 
April, 2014 and the abduction of over Two Hundred (200) secondary school girls in Chibok (local 
community) of Borno State although, the direct economic damage was relatively small in relation 
to the size of the economy. But the cost of terrorist attacks and insecurity in Nigeria has slow down 
trade activities particularly in the North East region and even the import/export trade activities 
between Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states that are sharing boundary with the neighboring 
Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic. This has caused the states and the country decline in revenue 
and other forms of tax which is gotten as a result of the trade and other business activities in that 
region (Oladimeji & Oresanwo, 2014). 
The indirect negative implications of the Boko Haram terrorist have the potential to affect the 
economy in the medium term by undermining consumer and investor confidence. The activities of 
terror attacks can reduce the incentive to spend as opposed to save, this may lead to reduction in 
the investment in an economy and this will have a multiplier effect on the economic development 
of the entire country through normal business cycle and trade channels. Falling investor confidence 
may trigger a generalized drop in asset prices and a flight to quality that increases the borrowing 
costs for riskier borrowers (IMF, 2001b). 
Table 1: Total Tax Revenue collections from 2009 – 2015 (For Nigeria) 
    
  
Tax Type  
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2015    
(Jan-
Apr) 
  (=N=‘b)  (=N=‘b)  (=N=‘b)  (=N=‘b)  (=N=‘b)  (=N=‘b)  (=N=‘b)  
                
  FEDERATION ACCT:                
a                  Oil Tax       
      
  
  Petroleum Profit Tax 939.4122 1,480.3639 3,070.5913 3,201.3195 2,666.3669 2,453.9474 441.7075 
b Non-Oil Taxes        
  Company Income Tax 595.1822 658.5026 654.4482 820.5655 963.4508 1,173.4907 225.8592 
  Gas Income   45.2271 9.7270 7.7269 17.7498 6.4437 
  Capital Gains Tax 0.4935 1.0367 9.3045 8.9166 19.6559 2.6498 0.2534 
  
 
Source: FIRS: Planning, Reporting and Statistics Department. 
KEY: 
GBTOs: Government Business Tax Office 
MTOs: Medium Tax Office  
LTOs: Large Tax Office 
 
However, the data above was collected from the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) of Nigeria. 
The agency is responsible for the collection of various taxes and revenues for the Nigerian 
government at the local, state and federal level. The tax and revenue collections ranges from; 
private, corporate and other government corporations. The table further portrays the overall 
breakdown of 2009 – 2015 government taxes and revenues on Trade, Businesses and other 
Economic activities (labeled non oil tax) at various levels in the country.  
2.4 Why Trade, Businesses and investments become Boko Haram Target 
Businesses are used as targets by terrorists for many different reasons: 
1. Some firms are highly visible targets; an attack on them is certain to attract the attention of the 
media, wide sections of the population and of course, the government thus supplies terrorists with 
the publicity they seek. 
2. Many firms are soft targets in the sense that it is impossible to prevent potential terrorists from 
coming near or even entering the premises. 
3. When firms are attacked, the production and economic process is disrupted. The firms directly 
or indirectly affected may be induced to relocate to other areas or countries. International firms are 
less likely to undertake direct foreign investments in that area. The economic situation within the 
affected country may worsen, leading to dissatisfaction and possibly even revolts, making it more 
likely that the proclaimed goals of terrorists become more acceptable and reasonable. 
  Stamp Duty 4.9143 6.5934 6.4623 7.3828 7.6025 10.9436 2.4024 
  Sub-total  600.5900 666.1327 715.4421 846.5919 998.4361 1,204.8338 234.9587 
  
Total Federation Account 
(a+b) 
1,540.0022 2,146.4966 3,786.0334 4,047.9114 3,664.8030 3,658.7812 676.6662 
  OTHER NON-OIL TAXES        
c VAT POOL         
  Non-Import VAT 363.5656 436.6102 492.0611 545.9196 629.6641 616.8852 214.7980 
  NCS-Import VAT  117.8417 128.2814 167.0925 164.6355 173.0194 186.0795 53.7516 
  Sub-total  481.4073 564.8916 659.1536 710.5551 802.6835 802.9647 268.5496 
d EDUCATION TAX 139.5350 89.1780 130.7419 188.4355 279.3587 189.6137 9.1967 
e CONSOLIDATED ACCT:         
  Personal Income Tax 28.4880 32.5639 43.4672 51.1734 48.4596 52.8456 22.3208 
  Pre-Operational Levy 0.2212 0.3682 0.4045 0.4319 0.4766 0.4469 0.1304 
  Stamp Duty - - - 0.0076 0.0037 - 0.0002 
  Sub-total  28.7092 32.9321 43.8717 51.6129 48.9399 53.2925 22.4514 
f NITDEF 6.8210 5.8861 8.6751 9.1379 9.8569 9.9082 1.2899 
g Total Non-oil (b+c+d+e+f) 1,257.0625 1,359.0205 1,557.8844 1,806.3333 2,139.2751 2,260.6129 536.4463 
h Grand Total (a+g)  2,196.4747 2,839.3844 4,628.4757 5,007.6528 4,805.6420 4,714.5603 978.1538 
  
4. Some companies may be part of the control and authority on which the power of the government 
that is opposed by the terrorists rests. The firms may be owned by the government or by members 
of the government. 
The stronger the effects terrorists may expect their acts to have on businesses and or trade, the more 
likely it is that they will attack firms. Firms represent attractive targets as they can be situated almost 
anywhere, and therefore, are difficult to protect. Moreover, private firms have to provide and 
finance their own protection. They have to hire commercial security firms and have to install 
expensive equipment raising their costs of production (Oladimeji and Oresanwo, 2014). 
2.5 Concept and theoretical assumptions on terrorism  
Recent treatment of Homeland Security research concentrated on how to spend billions to protect 
sensitive installations from attack (Malakoff, 2002, p. 254). However, it has been argued that this 
last line of defense is probably easiest to breach because of the multitude of vulnerable and likely 
targets (including discotheques, restaurants, and malls), the abundance of would-be attackers, the 
relatively low costs of attack, the difficulty of detection (little use of electronics), and the 
unlikelihood that attackers would divulge sensitive information (being unaware of connections 
beyond their operational cells; Atran, 2003, pp. 1534 – 1539). Exhortations to put duct tape on 
windows may assuage (or incite) fear, but will not prevent massive loss of life, and public 
realization of such paltry defense can undermine trust. A first line of defense is to prevent people 
from becoming terrorists. 
A rather Herculean task! Suicide terrorists are often labeled crazy cowards bent on senseless 
destruction who thrive in the midst of poverty and ignorance. The obvious course becomes to hunt 
down terrorists while simultaneously transforming their supporting cultural and economic 
environment from despair to hope. Research, however, indicates that suicide terrorists have no 
appreciable psychopathology and are at least as educated and economically well off as their 
surrounding populations. The significance of this section to the research is to expose the ignorance 
and the misperception of those who saddle themselves with the task of riddling the society of 
terrorists. Their ascription and assumption on the personae of terrorists and the prescriptions for 
remedy show a gross misunderstanding of the motives and consequently, the solution to this 
malaise. 
However, according to Ribadu N. (2015), because Boko Haram was a new phenomenon, it created 
a lot of confusion both in security and government circles, as well as among the citizenry. 
Understanding the motif and workings of the group became a problem. Many took advantage of it, 
including politicians, to throw blames at each other. In fact, the insurrection became a potent mirror 
of Nigeria’s ethnic tensions as conspiracies were tailored along ethno-religious lines. 
Coincidentally, the Boko Haram’s declaration of jihad came at the time when a Muslim northerner 
died in office and a Christian southerner became the president. At various points, Northern Nigeria 
was blamed for creating Boko Haram to make the country “ungovernable” for a president who was 
not from there. Some had a theory that says it was the government that was supporting the insurgents 
in order to diminish the numerical strength and, ultimately, political influence of the northern part. 
The Muslims contended that it was the work of the Christians. The Christians blamed the Muslims 
  
for it. Even within the Muslim community there were accusations among sects. The buck has kept 
being passed. 
However, the military operation is not spared from these disjointed criticisms, which confounded 
the problems of an institution already bedeviled by corruption and incompetent leadership. The 
mutual suspicion created by Boko Haram was extended to the military, with attention given to the 
tribes and religions of officers and men in ascribing motives to what the military had done, or failed 
to do. While Boko Haram would wipe out an entire village or stop commuter buses and execute all 
their occupants, the harshest criticism was spared for the military on any slight operational lapse or 
excess. International organizations, such as the Human Rights Watch and, more recently, Amnesty 
International also got entangled in the wave of the anti-military/government conspiracy theories, 
which substantially affected their reports. This demoralized the army and created international 
anathema for the military. However, this is not to discount the fact that the military’s blunders and 
panic in facing a new challenge also played a role in alienating it from the civilian population and 
gave credence to most of the allegations (Ribadu, N. 2015). 
As such, International response followed the pattern of the local reactions, largely in line with the 
narrative in the press and the undue, even unguarded, utterances by some otherwise respectable 
elders. The West, especially the United States, was looking for reason to escape engaging in military 
operations abroad. Thus, it was convenient for the international community to take the position not 
to help Nigeria, which has always been a hard sell for international support in the first place. The 
leadership then also failed to convince the world of its competence and seriousness in fighting the 
war. The West, particularly the United States, was looking for excuses and they got one in the lack 
of consensus among Nigerians. These distractions and lack of support make Nigeria lag behind 
while the terrorists became emboldened and began annexing territories, with alarming cruelty 
against defenceless victims (Ribadu, N. 2015). 
2.6 Frustration-Aggression Theory 
 
Frustration-aggression theory was first developed by John Dollard and his research associates in 
1939. These research associates were: “Leonard Doob, Neal Milles, O.H Mowrer and Robert Sears” 
(Ibaba, 2011: 242). Later the frustration aggression theory was modified and expanded by other 
scholars, including Aubrey Tates “Frustration and Conflict” (1962); Leonard Berkowiz 
“Aggression: A Social Psychological Aggression” (1961) and Ted Robert Gur “why Men Rebel” 
(1970). 
Frustration simply means the act of preventing someone from making advancement, progress or 
success in life, this blockage likely results to dissatisfaction in individual or groups who turn to 
react in a violent manner (aggression) as an indication of protest against hindrances to succeed. 
When this occurs, it can produce feelings of anger, which in turn can generate feelings of aggression 
and aggressive behavior (www.Alleydog.com). 
The Frustration - Aggression Theory Model 
Catharsis 
Aggression 
Achieved once 
aggression has 
been released 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from; John Dollard and his research associates in 1939 
2.7 Theory and Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory: Theoretical Explanation to the 
impact of Boko Haram and Terrorism on Trade in North East Nigeria 
Assumption I: 
The first assumption of frustration-aggression theory postulates that, violent behavior is as a result 
of frustration. When an individual or groups of people are prevented from realizing certain desire 
of theirs, they get frustrated and their reaction will be aggressive. The major desires and demands 
of the Boko Haram insurgents and terror group have varied, but they often focus on two main areas: 
the release of Boko Haram prisoners and the creation of an Islamic state. The Islamic sect believes 
politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt and false Muslims. It wants to 
wage a war against them, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a “pure” Islamic 
state ruled by sharia law (Walker, 2012). Even though their leader Shekau has pledged solidarity 
with jihadists globally, Boko Haram’s demands have largely remained local and the insurgency has 
fed on poverty, hopelessness and unemployment in northern Nigeria. These are some of the 
weaknesses the group took advantage in recruiting idle teaming youths in the North East region to 
cause mayhem in trading and other market places through bombings, kidnapping/hostage for 
ransom and among other ill menace. All these frustrations let to the aggressive behaviors.  
Assumption II: 
The second assumption holds that, aggression in behavior is due to the difference between what 
one has physically got and what he actually expects to get. It implies that, if what has been given 
or provided for an individual or group of people is not commensurate to what they expect, they will 
become aggressive much more. In this context, as discussed in the previous chapter that elements 
like; corruption unemployment, poverty and among other ill menace has contributed a lot in the 
group’s success story so far. The Boko Haram terrorist feels they have not been given freedom to 
practice their relation so that they can do away with all the elements of bad governance in their 
  
societies to bring about justice and equity through the implementation of the Islamic law (Sharia). 
They strongly belief only through this struggle can they achieve their goal, and that whoever dies 
in the course of their struggle will enter the kingdom of God (paradise). Despite the fact that Nigeria 
as a secular state has enshrine in its constitution that citizens have freedom to practice any religion.    
Assumption III: 
The third assumption holds that, aggression is caused by persistence rise in human expectation. 
This expectations are not constant, when they are met others surface. Therefore, the more the 
expectations come up and are not met, it is likely to generate aggressive behavior. The nature of 
demands and desires of the Boko Haram has been rising over the years. Initially, they demanded 
that they should be left to preach and observe their religion (Islam) with aim of propagating holy 
war (Jihad), western education and democracy as not permissible (Haram). Even though their 
method of preaching and ideology is not acceptable by the entire Islamic clerics in Nigeria. Other 
demands later on were that the government should release the members of their group whom were 
imprisoned for various crimes ranging from killings and other violent activities. Also that, Islamic 
law (Sharia) be implemented in all the northern states of Nigeria. However, all these demands by 
the Terrorist have not been made yet by the government, which is why the group has stepped up its 
attacks. Several attempts by the government to negotiate with the group have failed.  
Assumption IV: 
The fourth assumption states that when people are frustrated they would usually direct their 
aggression towards the cause of the frustration and if this is not possible it will be displaced unto 
another person or object. Frustration does not automatically result in aggression, but it produces a 
readiness for aggression if triggered (Akuva, 2012). According to the Boko Haram Terrorist, the 
Nigerian state is not ready to give in their demands so they have embarked on several attacks on 
both the government (all security agents)-198 and the civilian population. In effect, the terrorist 
have targeted government buildings, security personnel’s, places of worships, markets places, local 
villages and all other activities to cause mayhem and cripple the economy and government. These 
attacks were channeled to be presumed cause of the frustration or plight of the region which Borno 
State use to be known as home of peace. Boko Haram has influenced the short-falls in government 
revenues since the terrorist could not attack the federal government directly it attacks its source of 
revenue which often comes from trade and other business related activities in that region.  
Assumption V: 
The last assumption of the frustration aggression theory is that frustration sometimes does not lead 
to the perceived threats and sanctions from the source of frustration. During the most notable of 
these kinds of terrorist groups was the Maitatsine uprising, which began in Kano in 1980-1985 by 
Muhammadu Marwa (leader) and spread to Bulumkutu in Maiduguri (Borno State), Jimeta in Yola 
(Adamawa State) and Kaduna (Kaduna State) of Nigeria. Their ideology was a complete rejection 
of affluence, western materialism and western technology (Watts, 2005). It was during the military 
era in which constitution was suspended and Military decrees were installed. The Maitatsine were 
  
crushed through using military force, the group was gun down, some even fled to neighboring 
Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger but the government still followed them and made sure 
they were entirely killed or apprehended. As such, the series of similar notion of some of these 
Islamic fundamental sect’s could be viewed as been self motivated to achieve selfish goal and not 
for religious purpose as they often claim. As such, Boko Haram should be treated with more severe 
majors than the Maitatsine as they killed and displace more people than the later in terms of the 
terrorist acts.  
3. Methodology 
This study will employ the use of qualitative research technique and content analysis to further 
build upon the secondary data gathered through; empirical study/materials, Books, Journals, 
Statistical bulletins, Newspapers/Magazines and other online data bases and sources done by other 
related researchers with emphasis on trade that were exposed to terrorism and violence in the region 
under review. Thus, relevant literatures related to the researcher’s subject area will be employed to 
enable for clear and more articulated (scholarly) work. However, the study is part of my Masters 
Degree Research proposal paper being conducted in North-Eastern, Nigeria. As there are numerous 
impacts of terrorism in Nigeria, trade is one of the key to the North-East region as their major source 
of income as well as revenue to the government.  
3.1 Data Collection 
The study will employ the secondary and Tertiary data for analysis. The secondary data are those 
collected by the government or organizations but not yet processed. While, tertiary data are those 
already collected and analyzed for another study (Blaikie, 2003), which most certainly is useful for 
this study.   
3.2 Secondary data 
The secondary data shall include documents from the Nigerian government such as; Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS) of Nigeria. The agency is responsible for the collection of various taxes 
and revenues for the Nigerian government at the various levels. Also relevant documents from; 
National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and 
among other relevant government agencies will be used for this study.  
3.3 Tertiary Data 
The tertiary data shall be data from renowned peer-reviewed academic journals, textbooks, 
collaborative research reports on Boko Haram and Terrorism, and also documents from civil society 
groups in Nigeria. The opportunity derived from the tertiary data will enhance the researchers’ 
ability to understand other peoples’ views, comments and opinions on the impacts caused by the 
Boko Haram and terrorism to the Nigerian State. As such, these ideas and opinions will form the 
basis for empirical analysis.  
3.4 Data Analysis 
  
Data Analysis is the process which involves processing data collected in such a manner that it 
answers the research questions (Blaikie, 2003).  
3.5 Literature Gap 
Several literatures have tried to address the issue of terrorism in different approach. The rise of 
Boko Haram terrorist group in the North East Nigeria is also not left out by several researchers. 
Most researchers laid emphasis on the security challenges posed by the group. Osumah, O. (2013) 
looked at the terrorist group as posing threat to the internal security of the state, while others were 
looking at its similarities with other terrorist links outside Nigeria; like the Al-Shabaab militant 
group in Somalia and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Other researchers looked at the Al-
Qaeda ties to Boko Haram and Ansaru, while Ozdamar, O. (2008) was looking at it from the angle 
of terrorist behavior. 
However, due to the rise in the Boko Haram terrorist activities and the displacement of several 
thousands of inhabitants of the North-East region coupled with ripple effects on trade and other 
investments related activities of both private and government in that region, the writer found it 
imperative to dive in to bridge the gap which exists. As there are no much relevant literatures which 
discoursed extensively on the impact of Boko Haram terrorist in the North East region of Nigeria 
on trade and other business related activities like the investment into manufacturing and production 
of goods and services which could be imported or exported to neighboring Republics of Cameroon, 
Chad and Niger whom are sharing boundaries with some of the North Eastern states (i.e. Adamawa, 
Borno, Taraba and Yobe). 
As such, the study tends to align and bridge the existing gap in literature and the body of knowledge, 
also sought to come up with plausible solutions to the menace posed by the Boko Haram terror 
group in the North East of Nigeria.  
Also, provide recommendations will help the various stakeholders involved in; Government 
decision making bodies, Policy makers, captains of industries, political figures, Chief executives 
i.e. Chairmen of Local Government Areas, Governors and the President and even trade unions etc. 
This will not just address the issues of strengthening trade activities as well as government revenue 
alone, but also the generality of restoration of the past glory of peace, security and the co-existence 
throughout the North East and Nigeria at large.  
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